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The democratic question became of an ardent actuality within cooperative banks since the 
end of the 1990‟s. Founding element of human-sized organizations that were the first mutual 
or cooperative Caisses, is democracy running the risk to dissolve by necessity in the mature 
and hybrid giants that are the big banking cooperative groups nowadays?  
 
The present article unveils a multidisciplinary synthesis made possible by the conjunction of 
three researchers studying cooperative banks through three complementary angles: law, 
economy and management. After a first inventory of the possible symptoms of the 
disappearance of democracy inherent to the cooperative project, a more differentiating 
diagnosis is proposed, followed by an outline of some working leads for a creative evolution 
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Introduction 
For a decade the conservation of a specific identity of cooperative banks has raised questions. 
Since the rescue of capitalist banks by Crédit Agricole and Crédit Mutuel during the 1990s, the 
question of the cooperative "purity" of these banks has arisen in a blatant way, at least in a more 
visible way than it had been at the creation, during the previous decade, of private law subsidiaries. In 
a pioneer article, Daniel Coté had noticed, since the year 2000, that the maturity of the banking sector, 
with its oligopolistic concentrations, questioned the cooperative project within big mutuality banks 
and he called to the foundation of a new cooperative paradigm (Coté, 2000). 
Some years later, a whole series of publications are dedicated, in France in particular, to the 
possibility of maintaining a cooperative identity while facing the competitive banking game and by 
diversifying its funding sources beyond the sole „membership‟. In the middle of the 2000 decade, a 
collective work has come to put a noticeable milestone in the study of this delicate situation between 
"performance  and  solidarity"  (Richez-Battesti  &  Gianfaldoni,  2006).  Since  this  date,  studies  and 






































Author manuscript, published in "Corporate Ownership and Control Journal 8, 1 (2010) pp. 210-221"One of their most considerable characteristics is at the origin of the present work. It is about 
the variety of the disciplinary horizons from which arise the researchers who contribute to all these 
studies:  law,  economy,  but  also  sociology  and  management  sciences.  We  want  to  attempt  a 
multidisciplinary clarification of this delicate problem of the transformation of cooperative banks, by 
choosing as point of view, one of the key questions of social economy: democracy. The idea of 
intersecting  the  respective  approaches  of  an  economist,  a  jurist  and  a  researcher  in  management 
sciences  brought  about the  democratic  phenomenon  in  all its  complexity,  due  to the  plurality  of 
threats on the reality of a cooperative democracy within the banks who refer to it, but also in the 
unexpected  opportunities  and  in  the  evolutions  which  would  have  been  necessary  in  any  case, 
independently of the only institutional pressure to demutualization. 
Because it is necessary "to examine" all the denotations of the term democracy, this crossed 
outlook is presented in three parts inspired by the medical clinic sector. In a first part, the symptoms 
that feed the fear of a collapse of the cooperative project are exposed. In a second part, we move from 
the  symptoms  to  the  diagnosis  by  trying  to  make  connections  between  real  threats  and  simple 
indications of reorganization of the cooperative idea, a diagnosis intended to supply support points in 
its intensification. Finally, in the third part, we attempt a synthesis of the recommendations that seem 
to ensue from our previous analyses. 
1. The symptoms     
It is possible to find in law, as in economy and organizational life, the signs of a collapse of 
the cooperative project, particularly within banks. From then on, one can fear their conjunction to a 
radical demutualization scenario that would end in the disappearance of a major piece of the social 
economy. 
1.1 Legal symptoms     
A first ingredient of this scenario lies in the general report that the couple formed by law and 
cooperative ethics is changing in nature (Hiez, 2009). Whereas in its debuts, the cooperative project 
was created, in a sense upstream to law, its legal recognition was gradually made, throughout the XX° 
century, by the incorporation of the principles of this project in law. This registration "in the hard" 
concern, in French law as well as in French Canadian law, (ibidem, p. 3) the double quality principle 
(the co-operators are partners and beneficiaries at the same time) that of a-capitalism (limitation of 
capital remuneration and the compulsory constitution of reserves) and of political democracy (" one 
man, one vote"). Now, we can only notice, through all the studies led around cooperatives for about 
fifteen  years,  the  movement  of  a  reference  to  the  principles  to  that  of  a  much  more  vague 
„normativity‟  centred  on  cooperative  "values",  which  accompanies  the  transition  of  a  legal  rules 
system to a system of standards. 
This  supremacy  granted  to  "values"  could  not  be  considered  as  innocuous.  Whereas  the 
principles, without being unchanging, " evolve in a slower, less spasmodic way, than the substantive 
law of such or such State " (ibidem, p. 6), the standard recovers from a soft law which is imperative 
only in contractual limits, and its disregard only activates penalty recovering from action circuits and 
more random reactions than the malpractice against the legal rule. On that plan we can thus advance 
that "of a clear, unchanging and rigorous rule, we would go through to more vague, evolutionary 
standards, of a variable-geometry imperativeness" (ibidem, p. 8). From which the risk of a progressive 
nibbling of the cooperative principles, if the exceptions in the traditional principles multiply without 
the formulation of new principles or new orientations (ibidem, p. 9). 
1.2 Economic Symptoms     
At the same time we are entitled to wonder about " the normative capacity of cooperative firms in 
a  sector-based  environment,  and  in  a  more  widely  macroeconomic  one,  acquired  through  the 
principles and through market capitalist values " (Gianfaldoni, 2007: 15). So, at the governance level 
of  cooperative  banks,  the  logic  of  profitability  appropriate  for  the  private  enterprise  "  tends  to 
insinuate itself or to be gradually imperative " (Gianfaldoni, 2008: 4) through the following decisions, 





































1  External  growth  operations  and  profitability  requirement  of  the  shareholders,  which 
accompanies a new configuration of the consequent chain with an ascent of the value created 
towards holding companies or quoted companies, 
  Rationalization of the production of the banking services aiming at performances estimated in 
terms of costs and productivity gains, 
  Legitimization  of  these  logics  by  the  banking  sector  regulations:  law  of  1984,  statutory 
modifications of 1992, Bâle II prudential rules, 
  Financial evaluation publications by rating agencies, 
  Motivation  of  salaried  directors  and  administrators  more  and  more  centred  on  financial 
criteria and control levers 
Within the framework of a forward-looking scenario, such measures may contribute " to demutualize 
from the inside " the cooperative banks, by emptying of their substance the solidarities inherent to 
Desroches‟ "quadrangle" - directors, administrators, employees and members - and the institutional 
balances supported by this quadrangle. The relation directors-employees is affected by a tendency of 
the first ones to adapt the "democratic practices" to the "business practices" rather than the opposite 
(Gianfaldoni, 2007, p. 7), the relation employee-member aims towards a clientelism of the service 
relation  (ibidem.).  Whereas  between  administrators  and  directors,  an  increasing  difference  of 
technical competence can only lead to a real power asymmetry which dispossesses the members of 
their orientation power of the bank. Finally, the gigantic size of the mutuality banking groups can only 
naturally  increase  the  distance  between  national  administrators  and  members,  a  trend  possibly 
increased through functions personalization and multiple office-holding (ibidem, p. 11). Finally, we 
can even doubt the perpetuity of this quadripartite plan, as far as the adoption of a highly-rated 
vehicle,  introducing  the  fifth  actor  under  the  shape  of  the  shareholder,  comes  to  transform  the 
quadrangle into a "pentagon" (Ory, Gurtner and Jaeger in Richez-Battesti and Gianfaldoni, on 2006: 
99). 
Would  these  new  distributions  of  the  technical  capacity  as  economic  naturally  lead  to  a 
situation where democracy of right, with its votes and its resolutions approved in various assemblies, 
cover a not-democracy, reducing the statutory authorities to a pure ritual? The question is all the more 
acute as the ground studies show a narrow overlap between the institutional and the organisational 
one. 
1.3 Organizational symptoms    
The  study  of  a  big  French  cooperative  banking  group  (Jardat,  2008a)  joins  partly  the 
observations  made  at  the  same  time  by  Daniel  Coté  during  his  research-action  led  at  a  Caisse 
Desjardins: the project, the cooperative principles and the values are vain if they are not conveyed in 
the daily practices of the organization. Daniel Coté speaks of this subject as daily "moments of truth" 
(Coté, 2005: 55). The example treated in France maybe read as the illustration of a narrow interaction 
between the expected reasons of the cooperative project on one side, realized by a much elaborated 
internal law, and the constraints of the organizational gigantic size on the other.   
On  one  side,  the  competitive  (fight  for  market  shares  within  a  national  oligopoly  of  the 
banking network) and normative (banking regulation) pressure comes to reinforce the tendency to 
technocratic centralism that naturally occurs in all large organizations. The installation of information 
systems,  the  need  for  consolidating  overall  ratios  of  profitability  and  performance,  just  like  the 
increasing  technicality  of  the  banking  trade,  can  only  tend  to  increase  asymmetries  of  resources 
between  the  graduate  and  the promoted intern,  the hierarchical  one  and the  operator,  the  central 
director and the local administrator. However, sociologists have showed that for some decades, these 
asymmetric resources mechanically generate, in everyday life, asymmetries of power: so we see with 
sociologist, Anthony Giddens of the "dialectic of control in social systems" (Giddens, 1985: 64). The 
person who knows more, who has a wider viewpoint, whose functions bring to meet a vaster network 
of co-workers and exterior partners, mechanically detains a greater power. It remains to be seen 





































1stakeholders, or if it is on the contrary the opportunity to perceive material profits (incomes)  or 
symbolic excess (recognition, prestige), in a more or less close degree of asymmetry appropriate for 
the  private  enterprise.  Within  the  framework  of  a  technicality  and  of  a  developing  organization, 
everything points, a priori, that it is the second possibility that tends by necessity to come true, if no 
specific counterweight is developed.     
However, on the other hand, the very elaborated power architecture of the studied bank leads 
to permanently counterbalance these asymmetries of power and, otherwise to realize a utopia of the 
full and whole democracy, at least to maintain a logic of research for the consensus which goes 
against the technocratic and centralist tendencies. A series of decisions as strategic and organizational 
non-decisions,  engraved  in  memories,  completely  illustrate  this  assertion  (Jardat,  2008a:  32-33). 
These formative events of common faith in opposition forces of the members as of decentralized 
Caisses  to  central  directors,  would  not  have  been  able  to  take  place  without  strong  institutional 
architecture which establishes, with the inertial force of the legal statuses, a balance of power between 
the premises and the exchange as well as amongst diverse stakeholders of the bank (ibidem: 36-38). 
A contrario, we can only deduct that, without such a statutory architecture, the pressure in the 
demutualization would have been able to express itself in a much stronger way. The example of the 
other  cooperative  banking  groups,  less  structured  in  a  democratic  sense,  goes  moreover  in  this 
direction, as far as these last ones took years beforehand on the first one in appeal to the stock-
exchange capital and, correspondingly according to us, some more billion euro of losses during the 
subprime mortgage crisis. 
1.4 The scenario of radical demutualization  
The conjunction of these three groups of symptoms lets us catch a glimpse of a scenario of 
radical  demutualization:  whereas  the  size  and  the  maturity  of  banks  tends  to  strengthen  the 
asymmetries of power in favour of the central technocrats, the need to resort to private financing 
increases the pressure in return and burst Desroches‟ quadripartite institutional balance, which leads 
to  a  relative  intensification  of  the  emerging  relation  directors  -  shareholders  of  the  highly-rated 
vehicles and so facilitates the technocratic centralism in a circle of auto-intensification of the imitation 
of  the  capitalist  sector.  At  the  same  time,  the  flexibility  offered  by  a  formulation  of  soft  law 
cooperative ethics allows to accompany this demutualization of a legal de-knitting which maintains 
only the appearances of a cooperative continuity, at least until the de facto demutualization became 
irreversible. 
Is this scenario, which can seem extreme, all the most likely? Is it besides, on the same level, 
in the whole of the cooperative banking sector? A more detailed diagnosis, attentive to the movement 
of  institutional  reorganization  as  in  its  variability  according  to  the  places  of  power  and  the 
organizations, has to offer us some elements of answer. 
2 The diagnosis  
   Many analyses have revealed that the subprime mortgage crisis was due to some extent to the 
search of far too brought up returns, imperative of profitability to which are subjected, to a lesser 
degree,  banks  recovering  from  a  more  "patient"  finance  (Jardat  and  Boned,  2008).  Nevertheless, 
without  reaching  amounts  observed  at  Société  Générale  and  at  BNP-Paribas,  losses  suffered  by 
establishments endowed with a highly rated vehicle (Caisses d‟Epargne-Banque populaire, Crédit 
Agricole) turned out to be disproportionate to establishments protected from the shareholder pressure 
(Crédit coopératif), in spite of a size sometimes as big as that of the big capitalist banks (Credit 
Mutuel-CIC). This event reminds us that the cooperative banks do not form a homogeneous set but 
can recover, unlike a certain variety of statuses and culture which is not without consequences on their 
strengths and economic weaknesses. There is hardly to bet that their degree of "democracy" is also 
diverse. This report proves that there is on one side no cooperative purity and of the other one a 
capitalist radicalism which banks would be summoned to join, but an infinite possibility of gradations 
and possible choice in the evolution of the statuses and the practices of these banks. Where from, the 
interest to closely analyze their current processes of transformation, which may receive causes for 





































1instruments  in  the  service  of  this  project,  while  questioning,  via  the  law,  the  multiplicity  which 
recovers the notion of democracy.   
2.1    Economic Diagnosis  
   The economic prism allows to reveal the character of institutional balances dynamics which 
happen through the reorganization within cooperative banks. To foresee the situation, it is advisable to 
not only consider the cooperative institution, that is "a pre-existent and objectivable set of resources of 
justification at the economic agents‟ disposal anymore for their problems of coordination or their 
conflicts of reproduction" (Gianfaldoni, 2008: 8), such as the corpus of rights and statuses offer as 
example,  the  organization  charts,  the  internal  traditions.  While  observing,  over  time,  emergent 
conventional constructions one can hope to identify the germs of a renewal of the cooperative project. 
Indeed,  the  convention  results  from  interactions  which  occur  between  agents  during  tests  of 
justification  thrown,  launched,  relaunched  or  renewed  (Bessy  &  Favereau,  2003).  The  notion  of 
convention thus gets closer to that of „bookmark‟ that Commons had created in opposition to that of 
the rule denoting a more motionless reality (Jardat, 2008b). 
   The emergence of such conventions was studied through the main coordination relations 
within  the  stakeholders  of  Desroches‟  quadrangle:  the  coordination  between  administrators  and 
salaried directors, the coordination between members and administrators, the coordination between 
directors and employees and finally the coordination between employees and customers members. 
The board below synthesizes analyses redrawn in detail in (Gianfaldoni, 2008): 
 
Coordination….  Facts / vivid observations   Emerging Conventions  
Between administrators 
and salaried directors: 
national level 
Diversity of statuses 
Common objective: growth and 
development 
Economic utility conventions:  
Size effects 
Resources Economy  
Value added extension and market 
shares 
->Expansion on regional territories 
Between administrators 
and salaried directors: local 
level 
Cooptation phenomenon of local 
administrators, legalised through 
elections 
Compromising on social objectives 
or on management, treatment of 
the files of the members-customers 
Utility convention of economic and 
social value:  
Mutual understanding on the 
treatment of individual cases or 
appropriate to a given business 
sector  
- > Meshing of social networks 
Between administrators 
and members  
Weak influence of participative 
democracy on strategic questions 
Weak local cohesion strengthens 
the concentration of powers of 
national administrators 
New conventions of economic and 
social utility:  
- Movement of non trade or non 
monetary incentives conform to the 
collective interest in monetary 
trade incentives  
- New non monetary incentives 
standing up from projects of 
general interest  
- > Project of social and local 






































Between directors and 
employees 
Movement from a „fordist‟ 
organization, stiff, based on 
qualifications with monetary and 
non monetary compensations to a 
weaker direct salary, through a 
wage system with individualized 
variable part, degradation of the 
operational routines, increase of 
the turnover 
 
Conventions of skills, conventions 
of efforts,  
Contractual and organizational 
trust individual Preservation of 
tacit trust 
Between employees and 
member-clients  
Merchandizing of the services 
Depersonalization of the technical 
relation of the products 
Conventions of competence at the 
economic and social intersection  
Cognitive Trust  
Acquaintance  
Experience  
Engagement of the members in 
social actions  
- > Legitimacy reinvested in the 
clientele relation  
 
 
Such  an  analysis  creates  strong  contrasts  according  to  the  establishment  places  of  the 
agreements: most of the coordination relations, either only carry on economic utility conventions, or 
tend to separate the economic from the social in their emergence, with on one side a pure logic of 
business and the other one a social counterpart divided within social actions or within sponsorship 
without  consequences  on  the  way  of  driving  business.  At  the  local  level,  the  relation  between 
administrators and salaried directors appears as the place of coordination that best seems to escape 
this dichotomy by the individual treatment of the files of the customer-members. From the point of 
view of democracy, it means that the most long-lasting anchor point of this last one in the cooperative 
banks is situated in this precise place that are the local boards of administrators cooperating with the 
local director. As the renewal will take it or not on the cooptation in the constitution of these councils, 
we  can  then  qualify  this  hard  core  of  democracy  of  cooperative  banks  of  "Inhabitant  of  the 
Gironde"("Girondist") or "Thermidorien", even of almost "based on a tax qualification" in the case of 
a renewal till kingdom come of the same social group.  
This double report, of a variety of statuses and of functioning on one hand, and the existence 
of  a  hard  core  precisely  localized  of  this  democracy  on  the  other  hand,  leads  to  think  that  the 
democratic  idea  will  find  all  the  more  concrete  translation  and  will  resist  all  the  better  to  the 
demutualizing pressure than the group will be, by its statuses, decentralized in its functioning as in the 
distribution of the informative resources (information systems) and cognitive (training, qualification). 
2.2 Organizational Diagnosis  
If the cooperative banking groups have as a rule an inverse skeleton of that of the capitalist 
groups, they are some with regard to the others as diverse from the point of view of their organization 
and the group architecture as from the point of view of their rights and statuses. Statutory variety and 
organizational  and  management  variety  keep  pace.  So,  the  capitalist  groups  generally  have  a 
pyramidal  structure,  a  parent company  detaining the  majority  of  the  voting  rights in subsidiaries 
which control their own subsidiaries, the system of the "waterfall of holding companies" being the 





































1check de facto a multitude of companies. The cooperative banks are in an opposite situation: the local 
level detains generally the central structures, which supposes deliberations between local co-owners 
entities for all which concerns the central decisions engaging the common good of the cooperative 
group. Nevertheless this inverted "pyramid" cooperative does not present the same features in all the 
concerned banks. Whereas at the Crédit Agricole, the local entity owner is of a regional level, it is the 
Caisses themselves that, within the Crédit Mutuel, constitute the "basic cell" owner of the network.  
This variability must be considered as a multiple source of information and crossed on the 
interaction democracy-organization. We suggest making a sketch by advancing three aspects of this 
interaction: 1 °) for a long time, the cooperative banking groups do not recover from a "pure" model; 
2 °) certain group architectures may generate "distance reducers" between the democratic idea and its 
daily application and a “democratic strength” will result from it for the cooperative part which leads, 
in  a  certain  way,  to  a  "mutualisation"  of  the  capitalist  part  and  not  to  a  demutualization  of  the 
cooperative party; 3 °) There were concrete cases where the performance and economic growth of a 
group kept pace with a deepening of the democracy. 
2.2.1 The former "Impurity" of cooperative banking groups     
With the constitution of hybrid cooperative groups detaining private law subsidiaries, we 
observe  the  concatenation,  in  their  respective  summits,  of  a  cooperative  inverted  pyramid  and  a 
capitalist non-inverted pyramid to a mixed "hourglass", as it is illustrated with the example of the 
Crédit Mutuel (see fig. 1 below). Through the central entities, the members are certainly in command 
of the group. Nevertheless, situated in the bottleneck of the hourglass, the general management and 
the federative presidency federative directly control the capitalist part of the group. In the case of 
Crédit  Mutuel  the  federative  head  plays  a  key-role  in  the  relation  customer-supplier  (computing 




























































1The functioning that result from the observation reflects the permanent interaction between 
statutory peculiarities (law) and the organizational contents (the nature of the subsidiaries). At Crédit 
Agricole, the Press stated tensions between the requirements of profitability of highly rated vehicle 
(CASA) on one side and the concern of perpetuity and security of the administrators (employees in 
particular) stemming from the network of the other one. Within the Crédit Mutuel, a case study put 
forward a different dynamic. The base of the hourglass is here constituted with computing subsidiaries 
service providers for the Caisses of the network. The head of the network, responsible in front of 
Caisses, maintains the superiority of these last ones by ceaselessly asserting that they are customers of 
the subsidiaries and, as such, decide, as a last resort, of the relevance and the quality of the services 
supplied by these subsidiaries. 
2.2.2 Existence of "democratic distance reducers"     
The interest of an institutional architecture where the basic cell (i.e. the Caisse) is of relatively 
reduced size lies in the nearness between the administrators on one side and the members of the other. 
The  distance  between  elected  decision-makers  and  voters  is  reduced,  which  guarantees  a  better 
representation, while making election for the council easier to cross than in big entities. Where from a 
certain  renewal  in  the  composition  of  the  councils,  which  strengthens  in  return  their 
representativeness and their legitimacy. A contrario, a weak ratio elected representatives/members, as 
well as a low rate of rotation of the elected administrators, can only tend to increase the distance 
between formal democracy and real democracy. 
Another distance reducer, the training of elected representatives turns out to be a precious 
device to limit power appropriation by the salaried decision-makers to the detriment of the members. 
This technocratic drift was prematurely envisaged at Crédit Mutuel Centre Est Europe, by one of its 
historic presidents and the training of the elected representatives was explicitly asserted as a remedy: 
"the balance between knowledge and power can come true only if the elected representatives also 
have the knowledge" (Gueslin, 1982: 401-406). 
Such an institutional architecture generates a specific shape of economic rationality: in an 
organization where the peripheral entities (federate) detain a strong power based on law, the central 
entities (federal) are in the obligation to work in service logic to the federate units. Logic of service all 
the more meaningful as, at least through law, the independent Caisses may put in competition the 
services returned by the federation with their own auto-performances, even with external providers. 
Thus,  a  Caisse  commercialises  products  conceived  by  the  marketing  direction,  not  because  it  is 
obliged  to  do  so,  but  because  it  considers  them  to  be  more  relevant  than  the  range  of  “house” 
products.  The  balance  of  power  being  so  "inverted"  compared  to  what  takes  place  in  a  classic 
hierarchical company, any sorts of troubles of the capitalist bureaucratic company may be strongly 
limited: oversize projects and not adapted to the realities of ground, additional costs and inflation of 
staff and costs of the central services ("Parkinson law"), series of " stop and go " affecting change 
projects (in particular computing) insufficiently prepared in dialogue with ground operators whom 
they are going to affect, etc. (cf. Jardat, 2008). Indeed, in the case of a “hourglass” power architecture 
where the operational entities are at the top of power, the central services are in the real permanent 
obligation  (and  not  only  professed)  to  give  satisfaction  to  the  first  ones,  this  obligation  being 
ceaselessly reminded by the general management, hinge of the system (ibid ).  
This  economic  rationality  of  a  company‟s  democracy  is  measurable  by  its  effects:  for 
example, the unit costs of central services are widely lower in a federal mutualist bank than those 
whom we observe in a classic capitalist bank (Ibidem.). Thus, the democratic power conferred to local 
administrators does not uncork necessarily unto a mess of power and a decision-making inconstancy 
(clichés attached to democracy by aristocrats and oligarchs of all kinds since Classical antiquity), but 
on  the  contrary  creates  a  balance  of  power,  generative  of  relevant  economic  effects:  the  central 
entities are forced to abide by low cost structures supplying quality services to the local Caisses 
Given  that the subsidiaries  of  private law in charge  of the  functional services  are  in  the 
service of the cooperative part, within which the federative functional entities are themselves in the 
service of the Caisses, the "contagion" of ways of functioning will tend to be made of the cooperative 
entity towards the capitalist entity and not the opposite. It is all the difference between the purchase 





































1group within a highly rated vehicle there. We can so define two ideals of the hybridization between 
cooperation and capitalism. In the first case, the "hourglass" positions the democratic entity at the top 
of the institution and in fact the level vice-chancellor of the group. In the second case, it is the 
shareholders  of  the  capitalist  entity  that  may  play  this  role  and  exercise  a  pressure  in  the 
















Fig. 2: The " reversal hourglass ": two ideals of the hybridization cooperation – capitalism 
 
 
2.2.3 Democratic growth and evolution    
Hybridization  and  growth  are  not  paradoxical  with  cooperative  democracy.  This  last  one 
however cannot subsist without being transformed, as would tend to illustrate the history of the laws 
and statuses of Crédit Mutuel Fédération Centres Est Europe Europe (Gueslin, 1982; Jardat, 2008b; 
Jardat 2009). Indeed, built on the basis of a democratic cell of nearness, implanted in accordance with 
the  "  rustic  Alsatian  democracy  "  and  Mosellanne,  the  Raiffaisen  system  underwent  multiple 
evolutions  during  XX°  century.  De-confessionalising,  political  context  fickleness  and  de-
specialisation had put this model to the test, until 1960s, not without proving its robustness. The phase 
of strong growth of the years 1960-1970, carried in particular by the banking system of the lower and 
average classes, then by the invention of the bank insurance, constituted a factor of change of scale as 
considerable as the transformations in the course of the mutuality world. Nevertheless, we hardly 
assert, afterward, that the cooperative project subsided in that period. 
We  can  only  notice,  at  the  same  time,  that  this  economic,  technical  and  organizational 
evolution  was  accompanied,  from  the  end  of  1970s,  by  a  major  institutional  evolution  with  the 
increase  in  power  of  a  federal  "parliament"  and  the  drafting  of  a  corpus  of  laws  and  statuses 
establishing  explicitly  the  separation  between  an  "executive  power",  a  "legislative  power"  and  a 
"judiciary power". The solidification of the federation thus came along with the elaboration of a kind 
of internal "constitution" to democratically settle the political functioning of an entity that has become 
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1too big to rest on the only geographical and relational nearness. The presented solution is one of 
mixture of representative democracy (importance of the Employers' federation as "parliament") and of 
plebiscitary democracy at multiple levels (local general assemblies, district and federal). It comes 
along  at  the  same  time  with  an  effort  of  training  of  the  elected  administrators  to  the  banking 
techniques,  wanted  by  the  developer  of  this  constitution.  This  constitution  was  not  drafted  nor 
approved by a large majority in one day. It was the object of debates, long in their duration, and at the 
same time, wide in their participation and contradictory in their contents. That is why we can consider 
that through this constitution, it is a kind of constituent power of the members that expressed itself. 
The transpositions to the other banks as to the social economic context, which is ours thirty years 
later, could be neither automatic nor without nuances. Nevertheless, two lessons of the history seem to 
be imperative:  
1°) the impossibility to believe that a banking cooperative group can grow and develop its professions 
in a radical way and remain democratic, without its statuses evolving so as to offer new and adapted 
guarantees to this democracy to this new context, 
2°) the fact that there are cases where hybridization between competitive necessities and cooperative 
project is not translated by the pure and simple everyday acceptance of the cooperative bank. 
 
Legal Diagnosis  
It is finally advisable to never forget the plural and evolutionary character of the notion of 
democracy, as demonstrated through its history, its theories and successive regimes. In particular, the 
cooperative world owes take into account this plurality and evolution capacities of the democratic 
possibilities as well as the necessity of a minimal coherence amongst the political, the social, the 
economic and the cultural so that this democracy does not remain a hollow formula or a rite deprived 
of emancipatory impact.  
2.3.1 Plurality and evolution capacities of the democracy  
Democracy is analyzed, at a minimal level, as a political system, in the same way as oligarchy 
or monarchy (Aristotle 2004). Democracy thus constitutes one of these fundamental questions of 
living together for which the jurist (as the political analyst) takes charge. It does not however present 
the  rigorous  terminological  features  terminological  that  usually  characterize  legal  concepts.  Its 
political dimension and the attraction that it has produced since modernity has multiplied its usages 
and diversified its meanings. These senses are themselves extremely varied in the company but it is 
only by return about the politico-legal wealth of the notion that we can re-question the ambiguous 
relations between company and democracy.  
During  the  course  of  history,  democracy  has  pointed  to  various  concrete  modalities  of 
organization of the political systems and, at the same time, to opposite connotations. We know that in 
antiquity,  democracy  characterized  the  Athenian  city.  Although  it  consisted  of  slaves,  it  had  a 
scrupulous concern of not professionalizing political functions, using for example the drawing lots as 
the most neutral mode of appointment. It is also a model, almost mythical, of direct democracy. Very 
quickly nevertheless, the golden age goes out and democracy only comes back during the Renaissance 
with the interest renewed for the Greek culture and consistently its institutions. And so, democracy 
reappears as a positively appreciated political system and it will be finally established, following the 
revolutionary movement of the end of the XVIII° century, as the main model, considered even today, 
as impassable. The vote of the people appears in this concept as a central element, crystallising all 
attention, as it is shown through the struggle for the conquest of the universal suffrage. Nevertheless, 
behind this model, it is not certain that the agreement is so easy to realize on its precise contents, 
including within our western societies. And so, if it is not generally more forbidden to resort to a 
complete  direct  democracy,  it  remains  in  the  imaginary  as  the  only  real  democracy,  the 
representatives in the indirect democracy always establishing a kind of treason of the represented. 
And this favour for direct democracy can be observed at every level of the collective life, mainly 
through the referendum. We saw the political stake on the occasion of the adoption of the European 





































1March 28th, 2003 (art. 72-1 of the Constitution) is also a considerable demonstration. In the same 
way, the vote stopped representing the alpha and the omega of democracy, not being able to content 
itself with a periodic expression but requiring a continual participation, whatever the forms. 
It is also the fundamental structures of our societies, which experience confusions, democracy 
tending to absorb all the central political concepts. It is there so of the separation of the powers and 
the state under the rule of law. Nevertheless, democracies have no privilege of the respect for these 
principles, as the significant number of monarchies still in place can attest; and the Human Rights 
Declaration of 1789 makes no reference to democracy whereas article 16 integrates the separation of 
the  powers  which  classically  refers  to  the  requirement  of  a  distinction  between  the  legislative, 
executive and judicial powers (Montesquieu, 1998). Not only these are independent in the fact that 
they perform each a specific function for which they have exclusive competence but, besides, they can 
have mutual modes of control. Although these characteristics are not reserved for democracy, there is 
no doubt today that there is no democracy without their consecration.  
The understanding that had revolutionary France however was not always shared and we can 
even say that it was finally given up. In 1789, there was such a eulogy of the people, taken as an 
entity, that all the partial elements, the diverse communities, were marginally dismissed or excluded. 
And thus, all the power was concentrated in the hands of the people‟s representatives. This led to the 
refusal of all the intermediate bodies or to the appointment of a guardian of the central political 
power, that movement traditionally represented by the Dallarde decree of 1791. America supplied 
another model (Tocqueville, 1999), established on the expression of institutionalized communities, 
about which we know the influence that it exercised. Thus, France gradually established the existence 
of labour syndicates (1884) then association (1901), religious congregations (1905) and thus saw their 
place  growing  within  the society.  It  is  not  only  their  number that  must  be  notified  here  but  the 
institutionalization of their capacity to represent distinct interests; general and particular interests, 
what  the  law  calls  collective  interest.  As  such,  associations‟  and\or  labour  syndicates  are,  under 
certain  conditions,  more  and  more  incorporated  into  structures  of  dialogue  or  decision  for  the 
elaboration of public policies, at every level and in all the domains. At the same time, jurisprudence 
gradually abandoned its reserve in front of the risk of dissolution of the notion of general interest and 
recognized their capacity to judicially represent these said collective interests (Dupont, 2008). 
The same ambiguities can be seen as regards to the state of law, the notion conceptualized at 
the beginning of the XX° century (Herrera, 2003, p. 117). No more integrated into democracy than the 
separation of powers, it has nevertheless just as much part bound with it. The State of law consists 
mainly  in  the  recognition  and  the  guarantee  of  the  fundamental  rights,  in  other  words  the 
implementation of procedures likely to avoid the expression of arbitrary power.  
This triptych gives a rather faithful image of contemporary democracy, that it is not congeal 
in marble and knows at present new evolutions. These are the fruit of a double theoretical reflection: 
on one side the procedural works of Habermas (Habermas, 1992), and on the other, the efforts to 
rethink the place of the citizen in an ultra – technical society (Callon Lascoume Barthe, 2001). From 
there, although in a deformed way, was born the development of participative democracy, through 
which, the political system tries to give to the citizens a more active and direct dimension in their 
participation in the political life. Without being able to speak about new shape of direct democracy, it 
is nevertheless certainly about a new phase of the democracy. 
2.3.2  Consequences  for  the  concrete  translation  of  the  democratic  figure  in  cooperative 
companies  
We see that the democratic figure is particularly rich and that its application to the world of 
the  company  can  be  carrier  of  numerous innovations.  We  could  wonder  about  the legitimacy  to 
integrate democracy into this particular place as far as the first one relies on political sphere whereas 
the second belongs to the economic domain. Two remarks however show a good part of the interest of 
the  question,  at  least  for  this  work.  On  one  hand,  democracy  in  the  company  became  a  classic 
question since the 80s, with the evolution of the conception of the company, the status has evolved 
from that of the business manager‟s property to that of an aggregate of persons and constitutive 
relations of homogeneous reality, then qualified as institution, within which democracy is the vector 





































1more particularly our attention, claimed for a long time its democratic character - the “one man, one 
vote”  which  presides  over  the  organization  of  its  general  assemblies  is  symptomatically  called 
democratic principle-, by making a distinctive criterion with regard to the said capitalist companies. In 
these  conditions,  it  is  the  establishment  of  parallelism  between  the  conception  of  democracy  in 
political society and the cooperative company which must be looked for. But, in this search, one shall 
never lose sight of the wealth of the political notion. The only recognition of the capacity of all the co-
workers to participate in the vote cannot be considered as a sufficient indication of its democratic 
character.  
A last remark must be made on this matter. Democracy is not a simple political shape at the 
risk of being only an empty shell. There is no democracy without the citizens‟ capacity to perform 
their part because to participate in the public life is not innate but results from apprenticeship. It can 
take  extremely  diverse  forms  but  its  result  is  indispensable:  knowledge  of  institutions  and  their 
mechanisms, without which its functioning appears as an incompatible darkness that the citizen has to 
appropriate. Also, the citizen has to have a sufficient training to understand the life which surrounds 
it, without which he will not be capable of having an enlightened opinion on the questions with which 
his citizen's quality confronts him, and risks even to radically divert his interest from it. In brief, 
democracy is conceived only with citizens culturally ready for democracy, without which we are only 
in front of an enactment. It is obvious that this remark takes a particular strength as regards the 
cooperative companies, quite specially the banking cooperatives.  
This necessity of the cultural adaptation arises today under at least a double dimension. On 
one side, the rights and statuses of cooperative groups owe to be in sync with the type of democratic 
request which emanates from the civil society to whom the members belong. The diverse collective 
phobias which build up around the problems of environment and health, as well as the procedures of 
participation of the citizens in the elaboration of big projects of general interest with strong impact on 
the lifestyles and the local residents (public meetings on the layouts of TGV (HST) and the other 
projects of infrastructure, for example) show that the civil society demands that the participative and 
technical constituents of the democracy develop. Cooperative companies could not henceforth make 
an impasse on these democratic dimensions in the evolution of their rights and statuses, at the risk of 
stopping being at the avant-garde of economic and social emancipation and seeing members turning 
away from the cooperative project to dedicate themselves to forms of collective action more in sync 
with the requirements of the civil society. On the other hand, cooperative groups owe to raise a large 
number  of  members  with the  necessary  capacities so  that  the  participation is  enlightened,  which 
supposes an effort in technical training, but also strategic and sector-based information, either general, 
or targeted at a minimal level towards elected administrators, to co-decide daily with the salaried 
directors. 
2.4 Synthesis  
   In  the  crossroads  of  the  economic,  organizational  and  legal  diagnoses  of  democracy  in 
French  banking  groups  in  transformation  appear  three  key  factors  of  perpetuity  of  a  certain 
democratic reality: 
   1 °) Participation and technical democracy are necessary for the establishment of balanced 
conventions between the various stakeholders of the cooperative project. Where from, the requirement 
to  train  the  actors  (above  all  the  members  and  the  administrators)  to  avoid  the  technocratic 
confinement of the policy of these banks. 
   2  °)  Nearness  (physical  but  also  institutional)  appears  as  reducer  of  essential  distance 
between the democratic idea and its translation in human behaviour. Where from, the interest of any 
authorities which, within the cooperative banking groups, move a small number of representatives 
closer to the members and the technical decision-makers. Some of these authorities already exist and 
have to remain without being emptied of their substance by parallel organs: they are for example the 
local boards of directors, the supervisory boards, the foundations. Other authorities are emergent or 
could  be  created  which  would  imply  the  members  in  the  life  of  a  "technical  and  participative 
democracy" of the banking groups: thematic working groups, members' panels to judge the new offers 





































13 °) The necessary evolution of the statuses can be only made downstream to the observation of a 
cooperative project renewed in acts because law is not creative in itself, only the project is. Where 
from a double necessity:  
a)    At first, a better knowledge of cooperatives by themselves (from a sociological, economic, 
organizational,  legal  point  of  view),  so  as  to  locate  new  modes  of  establishment  of  conventions 
reconciling imperative of performance, solidarity and democracy, 
b)    Secondly, a process of establishment of new statuses which reflects the constituent power of 
the member, by opposition to modifications made hastily, surreptitiously even. 
3 Remedies   
   The establishment of a new cooperative project is indispensable in cooperative banks; we 
join here Daniel Coté's propositions. Without claiming to have sufficient data to have detected all the 
emergent forms of a new paradigm, we here intend to sketch what could constitute the main strength 
lines of the process susceptible to bring it to the foreground. The multidisciplinary crossing of our 
studies indeed brings us to formulate the following orientations: 
A)  It is required to show invention as statutory and as economic and organizational. The 
experiments made by Daniel Coté at the Caisses Desjardins agree with the observations 
made within the Crédit Mutuel: democracy, as constituent of the cooperative project, 
only exists if it is shown through within the daily practices of its stakeholders. 
B)  This invention should not however limit itself to the only professional and managerial 
practices that imply, for the main part, only the employees and the customers members. 
So  that  the  Desroches  quadrangle  continues  to  work  in  all  its  constituents,  the 
cooperative  reinvention  has  to  rest  on  at  least  three  pillars  which  appear  on  the 
crossroads of our analyses, with a certain order and without excluding round trips (figure 

























































1Figure  3:  The  tetrahedron  of  cooperative  reinvention:  the  invention  rests  on  training,  understanding  and 
constitution. 
 
(i) Education (more precisely training) is indispensable to make the members and the administrators 
capable  of  exercising,  with  the  necessary  qualification,  their  constituent  power.  Without  that 
necessary qualification, practices is mechanically applied a technical so narrow taxable rating as was 
it the financial taxable rating of the monarchy of July. Besides, it harbours two other virtuous effects: 
the first one is to strengthen the cohesion between members, because the sharing of technical and 
organizational mental plans is a form of institutional nearness. The second is to ceaselessly readjust 
the  collective  representation  of  the  cooperative  project,  by  a  language  that  anchors  in  the  bank 
environment as in its daily practices (commercial, technical etc.) as well as in its history. 
(ii) The “comprehension” or understanding that cooperative groups have of themselves is all the more 
indispensable to develop. The technical evolutions as institutional of their environment indeed bathe 
in a liberal ideology of "vice prosperity" widely orthogonal in their values. Inadvertently, the risk is 
then  big  to  introduce  organizational  and  managerial  innovations,  which  result  in  a  surreptitious 
demutualization. The cooperative banks have to develop a critical and lucid eye on the strengths and 
the weaknesses inherent to their statutory and cultural specificities, so as to enlighten the necessary 
evolutions of their functioning. The creation of institutes, the driving of community working groups 
(Pflimlin report) goes in this sense. 
(iii)  The  constitution  of  new  corpuses  of  laws  and  statuses  should,  as  a  rule,  only  intervene 
downstream to a sufficient development of the initiatives begun according to the two other pillars. It 
will be all the more fertile and justifiable, indeed, as will be associated with it the qualified and 
enlightened stakeholders. The scale of this constitutional challenge can be confronted to the duration, 
which was necessary, in the political history, for the fact that societies exceed the stage where, as 
Montesquieu had seen, only cities and microstates could work in republic, whereas the monarchic or 
despotic principle remained the lot of the big States. The elimination of illiteracy, the circulation of 
opinions by the print media, as well as the development of disciplines offering a bigger auto-reflection 
of the society (political economy, sociology) allowed to exceed the threshold of Montesquieu and to 
form big democracies. We can guess that this change of scale, for the cooperative company, will 
obtain a success of the same scale only if similar educational conditions and collective reflexivity are 
combined.  
 
Conclusion:   
   As  the  outcome  of  this  somewhat  programmatic  panorama,  we  cannot  miss  to  indicate, 
concerning  the  "understanding"  part  of  the  cooperative  evolution  process,  the  responsibility  that 
befalls to researchers and teachers as to directors and the administrators who finance their works or to 
say the least who give them access to the data. The notion of pluralism has here another implication: 
the  implementation  of  a  new  cooperative  project  will  be  collective,  multidisciplinary,  as  it  will 
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